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10.1  Introduction 
Economic analysis of  environmental policies is, if  not uniquely, at least 
unusually difficult. Resolution of these difficulties requires substantial invest- 
ment in data collection and model construction, only some of which is directly 
economic. Some of the reasons for the difficulties of environmental benefit- 
cost analysis are well known, appearing in intermediate and even elementary 
microeconomic and policy analysis texts (Baumol and Oates  1975; Fisher 
1981). Thus, even the average economics undergraduate major can be  ex- 
pected to appreciate that there is a problem finding demand functions for many 
services of the natural environment because they are public goods. At more 
advanced levels, they will learn about such thorny technical issues in imple- 
menting proposed solutions to this problem. Those interested in policy learn 
about the conflicting maze of environmental legislation, including problems 
of overlapping jurisdiction, differences in burdens of proof, and, most signif- 
icantly, disagreements  between laws over what role, if any, economic analysis 
should play. 
But neither the technical economic matters nor the special policy problems, 
challenging though they may be, provide the principal explanation for our 
assertion that the benefit-cost analysis of  environmental policy may well be 
uniquely difficult. Rather, that assertion is based on the central place in such 
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analyses of the complex relationship between policy implementation choices 
on  the  one hand  and the relevant natural systems (especially atmosphere, 
water bodies, soil and resident plant communities, and ground water) on the 
other. 
To  set the stage for a more careful examination of  this assertion, let us 
consider the nature of the system of environmental regulation and the origin 
of the complications in which we are especially interested. Figure 10.1 com- 
bines an overview of the linkage between policy choice and resulting benefits, 
with indications of the complications arising at each stage in the linkage. In 
the next three sections we shall examine in turn each of the links in the figure. 
In section 10.2, we shall describe some of  the problems implied by the way 
standard setting is constrained and practiced, and by the necessity of choosing 
an accompanying implementation plan. In section 10.3, we  concentrate on 
the central role of knowledge of  natural systems interacting with choice of 
implementation system. In section 10.4, we come to some of  the more ob- 
viously and traditionally economic issues connected with  valuing environ- 
mental services. 
The final section of the paper brings together the analysis of sections 10.2- 
10.4 with a brief assessment of  key emerging policy issues to produce our 
version of a catalog of data-gathering strategies likely to be most relevant and 
valuable for analyzing future decisions on the allocation and management of 
environmental resources. 
While our approach to identifying data needs builds from specific examples 
of current policy issues, the questions raised are general ones. Thus, we do 
not attempt to catalog what we consider to be the most important environmen- 
tal policy issues in the late 1980s and then base an evaluation of data require- 
ments on them. Instead we  argue that the interactions between the statutes 
defining the character of environmental policy and the role of natural systems 
for economic agents’ behavior affect the problems that would appear on any 
list that might be composed. Thus, regardless of whether one believes global 
warming or indoor air pollution is among the most pressing environmental 
questions, economic analysts will need to incorporate what is known about a 
form of these interactions in developing their analyses. 
10.2  Choosing Standards and Implementation Plans 
Table  10.1 (adapted from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  [EPA] 
1987a) summarizes the major criteria to be considered by the administrator of 
EPA  in deciding on standards under a variety of  legislative mandates. Two 
features of this table are especially striking. First, the criteria used to choose 
standards frequently focus on a subset of the information that would be part 
of  a full benefit-cost analysis. For example, under the Clean Air Act the pri- 
mary standards for criteria air pollutants are to be based on human health 
effects but cannot include compliance costs in the process of defining the stan- 301  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
Logical Structure for Analysis 
Definition of technology, discharge or 
environmental quality standard by type 
of pollutant and media 
Development of implementation plan to 
meet standard 
Change in effluent loadings 
~ 
J. 
POLLUTION DISCHARGES TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
I 
Changes in one or more dimensions of 
resources 
Changes in ecological habitat and non- 
human species 





Economic agents change their patterns 
of consumption of other related goods or 
their use or valuation of environmental 
resources 
Rationale for the Logical Structure 
The institutional structure governing the defini- 
tion and implementation of environmental pol- 
icy is complex. As a result of multiple, overlap- 
ping statutes defined by both environmental 
media (e.g., Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act) and the types of residuals generated (e.g., 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com- 
pensation and Liability Act, etc.), policies must 
be responsive to multiple objectives. Moreover, 
they can involve the definition of standards in a 
format inconsistent with available environmen- 
tal data or in generic terms that require consid- 
erable judgment to implement, enforce, or 
evaluate. 
The services of environmental resources are 
produced within a complex physical system 
where the effects of different patterns and types 
of uses depend on temporal aspects of those 
uses. In particular, the pattern of environmental 
quality corresponding to a chosen standard is 
influenced by the implementation program to be 
used to attain the standard. 
The services of  environmental resources ex- 
change outside markets, and therefore, the in- 
formation normally present from market ex- 
changes is not available. Indeed, as part of  their 
ordinary consumption choices, individuals may 
not have been required to consider changes 
comparable to those envisioned in any specific 
policy analysis. Information on the quality and 
character of these services can be quite techni- 
cal, involve subtle measurement problems, and 
is unlikely to be generated through the informal 
processes individuals use to learn about other 
commodities they consume. 
Fig. 10.1  Schematic description of issues in using economic analysis for 
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Table 10.1  Components of Economic Analysis Identified in EPA’s 
Enabling Legislation 
Benefits  costs 
Economic  Human  Othe?  cost 
LegislationiRegulation  Health  Effects  Welfarec  Compliance  Effective  Impacts 
Clean Air Act: 
Primary NAAQS” 
Secondary NAAQS 
Hazardous air pollutants 
New source performance 
Motor vehicle emissionsd 
Fuel standardsd 
Aircraft emissions 
Clean Water Act: 
Private treatment 
Public treatment 
Maximum contaminant level 
Maximum contaminant levels 
Toxic Substances Act 
Resource Conservation and Re- 
CERCLA (SARA): 









Uranium mill tailings 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
Atomic Energy Act 
X  X 
X 
X 
*  * 
X  X  X 
X  X  X 






X  X  X 
X  X 
X  X 
X 
X 
X  X  X 
X  X  X 








**  ** 
X  X 
X 
X  X 
X 
X  X 
X 
X  X 
X  X 
Source: Adapted from U.S. EPA (1987a), table 3-1, p. 3-2. 
Note:  *includes non-air-quality health and environmental impacts. **statute refers only to cost. 
***includes non-water-quality environmental impacts only. 
’NAAQS designates the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and relates to the criteria air 
pollutants. 
b“Other Effects” refer to nonhealth effects on humans and firms. 
““Welfare Effects” refer to visibility and aesthetics, effects on nonhuman species, crops, sodding, 
materials damage. 
dThe  type of  analysis here depends on the grounds for control. 
‘There is some question about whether any benefit information may be considered. One school 
of thought is that national aggregate benefit estimates might be allowed into this process. Such 
estimates would here reflect especially recreation as a pathway for accrual of  benefits to society. 303  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
dard.* In contrast, under the Clean Water Act, the definition of one type of 
technology-based standard, best conventional treatment (BCT), can be based 
on  costs (in comparison with the marginal costs of  secondary treatment at 
municipal waste treatment facilities) but not on the specific benefits to be re- 
alized at individual water bodies. 
Second, the mandates involve significant areas of overlap where different 
regulatory analyses are intended to influence the same types of  pollutants in 
the ambient environment, for example, primary standards for criteria air pol- 
lutants and New  Source Performance Standards defined on the basis of  the 
effects new discharge sources would have on the concentrations of these pol- 
lutants. 
One important implication is that economic analysis (in this case, benefit- 
cost analysis) usually involves an evaluation of the net effect of standards cho- 
sen on some basis other than economic efficiency. Another is that standards 
set under one provision of one law may well overlap in their effects with those 
set under another provision or law. This raises difficulties for the definition of 
benefits-at  least whenever marginal benefits are nonlinear-because  of the 
interdependence of baselines. 
Other serious problems introduced by the standard setting operation can be 
considered in a few specific examples. Setting an environmental standard of 








identify the pollutant to be regulated; 
select the form of the standard (i.e., a technology to achieve an emissions 
rate or an ambient concentration); 
choose the concentration or discharge amount that will be the average 
target; 
pick the averaging time over which the target is to be met (an hour, a 
day, a week, a year, etc.); 
define the exceedance rate(s) of interest (e.g., a weekly average standard 
might be paired with a daily upper limit); 
define what constitutes a violation, taking account of the statistical error 
structure displayed by  the  monitoring  equipment  and  other  relevant 
sources of  uncertainty (such as measurements made across a sample of 
different applications of a technology where the standard is technology 
based). 
Thus, evaluating the net benefits of an environmental standard is a compli- 
cated business (Portney 1984; Smith 1984). Not only do we need information 
on the effects of average (or peak, as applicable) exposures to particular pol- 
lutants (or ecological effects of  average concentrations), we also should be 
able to evaluate alternative patterns of allowed exceedance. In practice we are 
fortunate if we have the data from which to estimate dose-response functions 
over any range and averaging time. 304  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
The case of the particulate matter (PM) ambient air quality standards per- 
mits us to see some of  the troubles that can arise even within this limited 
context. The benefit-cost analysis done for PM was the most expensive of 
those discussed in the EPA report cited above (U.S. EPA 1987a; see our n. 1). 
It seems reasonable to assume that the quality of  the analysis reflects these 
expenditures. 
The first and largest problem in analyzing PM benefits was that the avail- 
able laboratory evidence on the health effects of airborne particulates did not 
match up with the available ambient measurements. Laboratory toxicology 
suggested that particles smaller than 10 microns across were responsible for 
whatever health damage was observed. Since preventing health damage was 
the mandated basis of the standard, the ambient standard had to be written in 
terms of  these small particles. Ambient measurements, with a few isolated 
exceptions, had for years been done in terms of total suspended particulates 
(TSP). As a consequence, epidemiological studies aimed at finding health ef- 
fects associated with airborne particulars inevitably labored under an imposed 
errors-in-variables problem. 
More fundamentally, however, analyzing the total net benefits of  the 10- 
micron PM standard required that the relation between TSP and the distribu- 
tion of  particles by  size, both before and after a standard, be understood. In 
addition, the analysis does not end with health because other benefits could be 
identified that depended on other sizes of particulate matter. In fact, the PM 
study conducted by EPA (and subcontractors) involved separate assessments 
of  the health benefits (including mortality and morbidity effects), the house- 
hold benefits from reduced soiling and materials damages, and the benefits to 
the manufacturing sector from reduced soiling and materials damage. The first 
two relied on judgmental appraisals (see MathTech 1982) of the “best” esti- 
mates of  dose-response relationships and the last two involved the develop- 
ment of new models linking consumer expenditures (on commodities related 
to household cleaning) and sectoral cost functions to measures of particulate 
concentrations. 
The importance of the institutional setting in combination with the techni- 
cal and natural systems also can be  seen in the cost estimates for the PM 
standard. Developing these estimates required a specification of  how  states 
would formulate their state implementation plans (SIPS), the degree of com- 
pliance with the plans, and the resulting estimated levels of particulate emis- 
sions. Emissions then had to be translated into estimates of the ambient con- 
centrations of particulates. Of  course, uniform ambient air quality standards 
do not imply uniform levels of actual air quality, a point we return to in section 
10.3. The changes in air quality from a specified baseline defined spatially 
will depend on how the assumed SIP describes the process (the set of dis- 
charge reductions) used to meet the standard in each air quality control region. 
To  stress the analytically arbitrary nature of  the institutional context, we 
report an  example drawn from Liroff  (1986). When  states decide how  to 305  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
Table 10.2  Average Emission Reductions of Volatile Organic Compounds 
Predicted to be Required to Meet Ozone NAAQS in Selected 
Ohio Cities 
Technique la  Technique 2b  Technique 
City  (%)  (%)  Selected 
Cleveland  87  50  1 
Akron  35  18  2 
Toledo  47  25  2 
Columbus  43  25  2 
Canton  22  10  2 
Youngstown  64  44  2 
Dayton  61  40  2 
Cincinnati  40  50  1 
Source: Adapted from Pacific Environmental Services, Study of  the 1979 State Implementation 
Plan Submittals (Elmhurst, Ill.: Report prepared for U.S. National Commissioner on Air Quality 
[December 19801, 7-12)  and published in Liroff (1986). 
‘Known as “EKMA.” 
bKnown as “rollback.” 
achieve the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for a pollutant, 
they may have a choice among different average levels of emission reduction 
depending on which mathematical model of the local atmospheric system they 
choose to use to predict ambient concentrations. Table 10.2, based on Liroffs 
table 2.2, shows the choice facing Ohio in designing its implementation plan 
for ground-level ozone. The two alternative models lead to alternative patterns 
of predicted ambient concentrations, though both would show no violation at 
any monitoring site. Thus, the predicted net benefits of the ozone NAAQS in 
Ohio (and generally in any state) will depend on the choice of modeling tech- 
nique, not just on the average level of the standard. Of  course, it is possible 
that either or both models may be wrong. Neither pattern of reductions might 
in fact result in meeting the NAAQS. 
We  now shift our focus and turn to natural system information and model- 
ing and the implications of how we handle such matters for our estimates of 
the benefits of environmental standards. 
10.3  Bringing in the Natural World 
The evaluation of  environmental policies inevitably involves economists 
with the systems that make up the ambient environment. If a policy mandates 
a reduction in  polluted waste water discharge from industrial and  publicly 
owned sources, the streams, rivers, lakes, and ponds that constitute the re- 
ceiving waters translate the discharge reduction into ambient quality improve- 
ments that are valued by individuals. If we turn this notion around-if  public 
policy involves mandated upper limits for concentrations of pollutants in the 
ambient atmosphere, the transportation, dilution, and  transformation pro- 306  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
cesses at work in that atmosphere must have a key role in determining how 
much discharge reduction has to be accomplished to meet the standard. 
While this seems intuitively clear, the importance of  knowledge of  those 
processes is greater than these observations suggest. There are two reasons for 
this. One is ubiquitous; the other is found to be central to some situations and 
not to others. The ubiquitous influence is space, the differential location of 
pollution sources and pollution receptors in the two-dimensional plane.3 Ad- 
ditional complication is introduced by the nonlinearity of most environmental 
processes. 
Consider the role of location. In the simple situation, a policy is represented 
graphically or mathematically by a single marginal benefit (or damage) and a 
single marginal cost function. These may have as arguments either ambient 
pollutant concentrations or pollution discharged. The optimum policy is de- 
fined by the usual MB = MC condition. The addition of spatial detail merely 
replicates this condition at each location. That is, efficient policies equate the 
marginal benefits to the marginal costs of  realizing a given level of ambient 
quality at each location. In conventional Pareto efficiency terms this corre- 
sponds to equality of the relevant sum (for that location and its residents) of 
the marginal rates of  substitution for environmental quality (in relation to a 
numeraire) to the corresponding shadow price describing the real costs of at- 
taining it. The natural system is implicit in the definition of the real marginal 
costs. When perfect mixing of all pollution discharges produces uniform con- 
centrations  of  pollutants  everywhere  in  the  ambient  environment-as  is 
roughly true for some air pollutants under certain physical and meteorological 
conditions-the  simple model offers a reasonably good approximation. 
But in the largest number of cases, it does not. For a mandated policy of 
emission reductions, even if that policy involves equal percentage reductions 
at all sources, the amount of ambient quality improvement will, in general, be 
different at every point in the relevant environmental medium. If the policy to 
be  evaluated involves mandated ambient quality standards, the situation is 
even more at odds with the simple model. Not only will the concentration in 
the standard characterize only a few points in the environment after the policy 
is implemented, but which points those are and by how much the quality at 
every other point is better than the standard will, in general, depend on exactly 
how the standard is implemented. 
Both environmental quality levels and, more important, improvements in 
quality attributable to a policy are different at every point in the environment. 
Moreover, every point is usually characterized by  different levels of  human 
“use.” Thus, for example, some points in the atmosphere coincide with dense 
residential  population,  some  with  sparse; some  coincide  with  industrial 
plants, some with office buildings, some with vacant space. Similarly, along a 
river some segments will have heavy recreational use (or prospectively have 
such use) because of conditions of access, bank type, current, and tempera- 307  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
hue. Other segments may be unattractive to recreationists for reasons having 
nothing to do with the level of pollution at that location. 
Therefore, the estimates of benefits of proposed (or actual) environmental 
management policies  are  intrinsically  dependent  on  the  accuracy of  our 
knowledge of  the natural world processes, upon the detail required for the 
spatial resolution, and on the implementation plan assumed in the analy~is.~ 
The net benefits of a given policy, P,  can be written in fairly general terms as 
follows: 
(1)  NB (PI = Bl  {fll  [Dl (PI1 +  fz, P2  (P)] + . . . +f,l [Dn  (P)]) 
+ B, {fI, [Dl (PI1 + f,, [D,  (PI1 + . . . +  f.2  [D,  (P)1) 
+ B, {flm  [D,  (PI1 + f,,  [D,  (PI1 + . . . + f,,  [D,  (P)1) 
- c,  (X" -  D,  (m, 
-  C,  (XI -  D,  (F)) -  C, (X, -  D,  (P)) - . . . 
where there are m points (call them receptor locations) at which we agree to 
measure ambient quality and infer benefits, and n sources of  pollution. The 
functions  Jj [Di  (P)]  represent the environmental transformation of discharge 
level Dj  (P)  into a contribution to ambient quality at point j.  Writing Dj  as a 
function of  P, the policy, we  can emphasize the point that (in most cases) 
pollution management policies operate through affecting discharges of pollu- 
tants. The C,(.)  functions describe the costs to source i of reducing emissions 
by X, -  Di  (P),  with Xi  the uncontrolled emissions of that source. 
In general, the benefit functions [Bj  (.)I  are different for every j  because of 
the factors mentioned above. Thus, every discharge level is a function of the 
policy choice, and the ambient quality at every receptor location can, in prin- 
ciple, be a different function of every discharge level. For example, if P con- 
sists of a required 50% reduction of prepolicy discharge at every source, that 
defines the vector {D,  (P),  . . . ,  D,  (P)}.5  These discharges are transformed 
by  the functionsx, (0;)  into ambient pollution (or quality levels; and the re- 
sulting quality at each receptor location is valued using the functions Bk(  ). 
If, on the other hand, the policy P requires an  upper limit on ambient pollution 
at any receptor location, call it S,, analytical implementation implies finding a 
vector of discharges satisfying the requirement. This will depend on the func- 
tionsxj (DJ,  for we are solving a problem of the following form: 
find Dj  (P)  such that Vj xij  [Di  (p)]  5  S,. 
1 
This is different than the description in textbooks because the policy is not 
defined to meet an efficiency criterion. We  simply use (1) to evaluate how its 
implications relate to the net benefits realized with some baseline or status quo 
position. There may be no such vector. More often, since n >  m,  there will be 
an infinite number. The benefits flowing from the choice S, will depend on 
which vector D(P) is evaluated. This is because every such vector will, in 308  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
general, produce a different pattern of ambient quality across receptor loca- 
tions. Further, in this general formulation, there is no presumption that quality 
better than the standard is valued at zero.6 
To  illustrate what  happens if  we ignore the natural  system,  we offer one 
very simple and two not-so-simple examples.  First, consider a hypothetical 
region with two sources of air pollution and three receptors or agreed-on mon- 
itoring locations. The sources are, in fact, linked to the receptors by an atmo- 
spheric system that can be characterized by a matrix of transfer coefficients, 
T, as follows: 
Receptor 
Source  I  I1  I11 
A  21.5 
B  122 
Ambient quality, Q,  is determined on the basis of source discharge as:’ 
(2)  Q = DT,  where D = (D,,  DB). 
The benefits  of  discharge  reductions  are  assumed  obtainable,  as  damages 
avoided, from a quadratic damage function. 
(3)  Gi(Q)  = Q:  for each receptor  is. 
If  initial discharges are D,,  = 4,  D,,  = 2, the base or initial quality levels 
are:9 
(4)  (Q.1  = (10, 8,6), 
with resulting damages 
(5) 
111  c  Gi = 200. 
i=I 
The effect of what we might call environmental 
considering three different methods of evaluating 
creasingly stiff ambient quality standards, S; 
ignorance is illustrated by 
the benefits of setting  in- 
(i)  We know nothing about the environment (in particular, we do not know 
T),  so we simply work from the regional average concentration before 
the standard is set and assume that the standard is the average concen- 
tration after it is set. Let us denote this approach to estimating benefits 
as method (i), designated B1.  Then 
wherej  indexes the severity of the standard. 
We still know nothing about the atmospheric system (T)  but disaggre-  (ii) 309  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
gate benefits. In this formulation, benefits are calculated only for recep- 
tors where the initial quality level is worse than the standard. Moreover, 
it assumes that at every such point, after the imposition of the standard, 
quality just equals the standard. This is method (ii) (B2),  given by (7): 
(7)  Bj = c  G(QJ - G(Sj), 
for all i such that Q, >  S,. 
We  know and use T  Implementation policy is a “rollback” rule from 
base period discharges. That is, with particular standard, Sj,  the roll- 




so that benefits are 
(9)  Bj’  = c  “7QJ -  G (Q(Rij))l, 
I 
where 
(10)  QW,) = (1 -Rj> (Daop  DBo)[T1. 
Each of  these methods provides a definition of the aggregate benefit func- 
tion and with it describes our knowledge of the environment. Table 10.3 sum- 
marizes the aggregate benefits under the three definitions and four levels of 
ambient quality standard: 8, 6, 4, and 2. Both total and marginal benefits are 
Table 10.3  Aggregate and Marginal Benefits: The lbo  Source-Three 
Receptor Example 
~~  ~ 
Aggregate Total  Aggregate Marginal 
Benefits by  Standard 
Method  Definition  86428642 
Benefits by Standard 
B’  Average initial re- 
gional concept of 
quality relative to 
standard  0  84  144  180  0  42  30  18 
B2  Actual initial quality 
relativetostandard  36  92  152  188  18  28  30  I8 
B3  Actual initial quality 
relative to actual 
quality as deter- 
mined for rollback 
implementation  72  128  168  192  36  28  20  12 310  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
shown, with the latter defined as the difference between the benefit at standard 
Sj + 2 and at S, divided by two. 
At those standards with small improvements over the baseline quality, the 
three measures exhibit the least agreement for both total and marginal bene- 
fits. Methods (i) and (ii) ignore benefits produced by  improvements beyond 
the standard required by the control actions necessary to meet the standards at 
the binding receptor.  lo  As the standard is tightened they exhibit closer corre- 
spondence. This is not surprising because as the standard is tightened toward 
zero pollution, the variation around the average ambient level is reduced. 
Thus, the difference between the standard and the quality level at any particu- 
lar nonbinding receptor is reduced, and with it the sources for the differences 
between B’,  B2,  and B3 diminish. 
The marginal benefits calculated ignoring the natural system are an espe- 
cially unreliable guide to optimal policy choice. These results are not simply 
artifacts of our example. Two more realistic cases illustrate the peril of igno- 
rance of the natural world’s systems. The first is based on the data developed 
for the  Baltimore,  Maryland,  region  in  the  paper  by  Oates,  Portney,  and 
McGartland (1989), using their air quality results (for total suspended partic- 
ulates) and translating them into versions of  our surrogate benefit measures. 
The primary difference is that method (iii) reflects a least-cost rather than a 
rollback scheme for implementation. So we  refer to it as method (iii’) (see 
app. A for data and methods). Table 10.4 contains a summary of  the results 
Table 10.4  Surrogate Benefits of Reductions in Total Suspended Particulates for 
Baltimore by Level of Ignorance and Standard (millions per year) 
Level of Standard (ugh’) 
115  110  105  100  95  90  85 
Method (i): 
Total  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
%hod (i) (modified)? 
Total  12.3  23.6  34.5  45.2  55.1  64.5  73.6 
Marginal  12.3  11.3  10.9  10.7  9.9  9.4  9.1 
Total  2.6  6.0  9.7  15.4  21.2  28.2  35.2 
Marginal  2.6  3.4  3.7  5.7  5.8  7.0  7.0 
Total  7.7  19.7  27.7  34.9  46.2  59.1  73.7 
Marginal  7.7  12.0  8.0  7.2  11.3  12.9  14.6 
Marginal benefitsb  7.2  12.9  9.1  8.5  13.2  15.1  16.4 
Source: See the appendix for a description of the data and method. 
aThe modification consists of comparing initial average concentration to projected average con- 
centrations for each standard, where the projection  depended on the percentage change in the 
standard. 
bTaken from Oates, Portney,  and McGartland (1989); amounts given are in  millions of  1980 
dollars. 
Method (ii): 
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for total and marginal (surrogate) benefits for each estimation approach or 
level of knowledge. The marginal benefits calculated by  Oates et al. (1989) 
are shown at the bottom of the table. 
Thus, in a much more realistic example, the methods that ignore the natural 
environment produce problematic estimates of  marginal and total benefits. 
Method (i) shows no benefits because the base case,average  TSP concentration 
is already below all the standards  considered. Method (ii) produces substantial 
underestimation of both marginal and total benefits. It ignores improvements 
at receptors that have quality better than the standard before it is imposed. 
Modified method (i) depends on simple reduction of the average TSP con- 
centration for the region for each standard level by the same percentage as that 
standard represents a reduction of the baseline standard that McGartland et al. 
(1988) use in their benefit calculations: 120 micrograms per cubic meter (120 
ug/m3).  It produces total benefit numbers roughly similar to those obtained in 
method (iii), the method reflecting best available knowledge of  the environ- 
ment. But this apparent improvement does not extend to marginal benefits. 
The actual pattern obtained via method (iii) shows an early peak at 100 ug/m3, 
followed by a dip and, then, subsequent increases. Indeed, marginal benefits 
are still increasing at the strictest standard shown.“ 
Of course, one might criticize this example as well, noting that we are not 
working with a “real” damage function. Our last example does just that, using 
data on water quality changes, as measured by  dissolved oxygen, generated 
by a complex and quite realistic model of the Delaware River estuary; a map- 
ping of dissolved oxygen (DO) into sustainable recreation types from a second 
source; and  an annual per capita willingness to pay  for the availability of 
water-based recreation by  type from a third source. (The details of the data 
and calculations are set out in the appendix.) The results for total and marginal 
benefit estimates are given in table 10.5. 
Table 10.5  Surrogate Benefits of Improvements in Water Quality in the 
Delaware Estuary by Level of Ignorance of Standard 
Water Quality Standard 
(ppm of Dissolved Oxygen) 
3.5  5.0 
Method (i): 
Total  0  420.2 
Marginal  0  420.2 
Total  184.5  510.6 
Marginal  184.5  326.1 
Total  372.7  581.4 
Marginal  372.7  208.7 
Method (ii): 
Method (iii): 312  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
The patterns of marginal benefits once again display the largest effects from 
ignorance of the natural world. Method (i) implies there would be no benefits 
of  going from the baseline situation to a standard of  at least 3.5 parts per 
million (ppm) of DO for every reach of the river. But the marginal benefit of 
tightening the standard from 3.5 ppm to 5.0 pprn  of  DO is 420.2. Under 
method (ii)-reach-by-reach  disaggregation, but assuming benefits only for 
reaches that are initially worse than the standard-the  marginal benefit of the 
3.5 ppm standard is  184.5 and that of  the 5.0 ppm  standard is 326.1. This 
pattern is almost exactly the reverse of that observed when complete knowl- 
edge is used in method (iii). In this case, the marginal benefits associated with 
the lower standard are 372.7, while those associated with the next improve- 
ment to 5.0 ppm are 208.7. Thus, even though the total benefits estimated to 
be associated with the tougher standard are roughly similar for methods (ii) 
and (iii), the marginal benefit patterns are very different. 
The results of  these examples may be so obvious that their applicability 
seems doubtful. Who would ever use methods such as (i) or (ii)? The an- 
swer-and  this is the key to our later recommendations-is  just about every- 
one. An  examination of the invaluable compilation of  benefit estimates pub- 
lished by Freeman (1982) reveals that every one of the reported air pollution 
benefit studies uses a version of B’  or B2,  with most relying on a method very 
like method (i). The water pollution benefit studies he summarizes all use a 
version of  B2 in which full attainment of  the most  ambitious standards (or 
ambient quality goals) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) is assumed. 
As important as pointing out the prevalence of  benefit estimates based on 
ignorance of natural systems is, an attempt to understand why this is the case 
also merits consideration. In the case of water pollution control benefits, the 
answer is generally that insufficient resources have been invested in  the re- 
search needed to reduce our ignorance. Translating the technology-based dis- 
charge standard definitions of  the CWA  into actual discharges from tens of 
thousands of point sources of water pollution is hard enough. But then trans- 
lating such changes in discharges, were they available, into changes in water 
quality indicators that in turn can be valued by individuals, involves data gath- 
ering, modeling, and basic conceptual research efforts beyond what the spon- 
sors of such research have been willing to pay.I2 Finally, the data on valuation 
that is available generally is in the form of  step functions unsuited to the val- 
uation of benefits of  small improvements in quality, especially at reasonably 
clean receptor locations. 
For air pollution benefits, the state of the art of emission inventories and air 
quality modeling has for some time been capable of  supporting the sort of 
disaggregated,  location-specific benefit estimates obtained by  Oates et  al. 
(1989) for Baltimore. When national total benefit estimates have been the ob- 
ject of  the exercise, however, it apparently has been too daunting a task to 
manage the necessarily massive data banks and atmospheric models. 
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Table 10.6  Marginal Benefits of Reductions in Total Suspended Particulates 
for Baltimore by Implementation  Method and Standard 
(millions of 1980 dollars) 
Level of  Standard (ugh3) 
Implementation Method  115  110  105  100  95  90  85 
Command and control  2.2  10.5  9.7  11.5  7.5  10.0  6.5 
Least cost  7.2  12.9  9.0  8.5  13.2  15.1  16.4 
Source: Oates, Portney, and McGartland (1989), table 1 
environmental quality  changes,  we  should consider the  effects of  imple- 
mentation plans on benefits. This is the primary focus of Oates et al. (1989). 
While their paper actually is addressed to the relevance of  benefit estimates 
for the choice between regulatory approaches (“command and control” vs. use 
of  economic incentives), their results provide a fine illustration of  the point 
that for any given level of environmental knowledge, estimates of benefits will 
depend on the  method of  implementation-the  pattern of  discharges-as- 
sumed. 
Thus, in table  10.6 we reproduce their marginal benefit estimates for the 
command and control and “least cost” implementation approaches. In this 
case, neither set of estimates can be characterized as “wrong.” Both reflect the 
best environmental information available. Nonetheless, they are very differ- 
ent. Thus, the statement that a particular standard yields particular benefits 
has meaning only when an implementation method is explicitly assumed. 
The same standard, treated as an upper bound on a pollutant’s allowable 
concentrations, can imply an infinite number of  aggregate marginal benefit 
patterns because these benefits will depend on how  the standard is imple- 
mented and on what the natural system implies this implementation plan will 
yield as the ambient concentrations for each receptor location. In most theo- 
retical treatments of these issues, this problem is avoided by  simplifying as- 
sumption. The benefits are taken to be measured at a single, representative 
point in the environment. The costs of  improving quality at that point are 
assumed to reflect the environmental transformations implicitly. 
10.4  Evaluation Benefits: Learning from Past Research and 
Identifying New Initiatives13 
The statutory guidelines creating the demand for valuation measures for 
environmental resources and the time horizons written into the statutes make 
it impossible to develop new benefit-cost studies for each decision. This has 
led to growing interest in the methods used to transfer valuation (or demand) 
estimates derived in one situation to a new one. Both the Oates et al. (1989) 
study of air quality in Baltimore and our own analysis of water quality in the 314  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
Delaware River used valuation estimates derived from one or more studies in 
the literature (see the Appendix). For the most part, these were derived from 
judgmental reviews of the literature and propose a best estimate (or a range of 
values). 
Because the services of environmental resources exchange outside markets, 
the methods used  to estimate consumers’ values for them have developed 
along two lines. The first focuses on observable behavior that can be linked 
by  assumptions to the resource of  interest. Methods relying on this strategy 
have usually been labeled the indirect approaches. They include: the travel 
cost recreation-demand models, hedonic price functions (property value and 
wage rate), hedonic travel cost functions, damage-averting cost models, and 
factor productivity (or reverse value-added) methods. In each case, an individ- 
ual’s (or a firm’s) actions are assumed to be partially motivated by a desire to 
obtain the service of  an environmental resource (or to avoid the detrimental 
effects of  pollution to that resource). Using models based on these actions, 
researchers attempt to estimate the marginal value of changes in the quantity 
or the quality of the nonmarketed resource. 
The second group of methods relies on survey techniques that ask respon- 
dents how they would value (contingent valuation) or change their behavior 
(contingent behavior) in response to a postulated, hypothetical change in the 
services of an environmental resource.’4  This method assumes that an individ- 
ual’s response to a hypothetical situation provides an authentic description of 
how he (or she) would respond to an actual change. 
The purpose of this section is to suggest that efforts to summarize and eval- 
uate benefit estimates offer another kind of opportunity-to  evaluate what we 
have learned about the values of environmental resources; to examine the sen- 
sitivity of these estimates to the modeling decisions required to develop them; 
and, based on these two appraisals, to identify new data and analyses required 
to resolve the uncertainties leading to the disparities in valuation estimates. 
The required analyses treat the results from past studies as data to “test” 
whether differences in the estimates (across studies) reflect systematic varia- 
tions in  the resources being valued or in  the assumptions and the methods 
underlying them. 
While this  approach appears to be  a  new  one for evaluating empirical 
research in  economics, it is not new  to other social and  health sciences.” 
“Meta-analysis” describes a research method that seeks to provide systematic 
summaries of the findings from empirical evaluations of educational or social 
programs. Du  Mouchel and Harris (1983), for example, proposed a similar 
strategy for the transfer of risk assessment models from animal to human pop- 
ulations. 
Our objective is broadly similar. However, we  seek to evaluate whether 
there are systematic influences on the values estimated for specific types of 
environmental resources and whether these influences can be  distinguished 
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would be undertaken within a single empirical study in which consistency in 
data sources, reporting conventions, and statistical modeling criteria could be 
maintained across the resources and models studied. Unfortunately, this was 
not possible. Consequently, we summarize the results of  a pilot study con- 
ducted by Smith and Kaoru (1990) that uses the existing literature as the basis 
for an examination of the determinants of  valuation estimates for recreation 
resources. The focus on value estimates is deliberate because, regardless of 
the original objective of the research, benefit estimates have been the single 
most important policy use of the outputs this type of research. 
Equation (1) defines the basic model. To use it, we maintain that the valua- 
tion estimate relevant for our example, the real consumer surplus, RCS, per 
unit of use of a site is a function of four types of variables: the type of recrea- 
tion site, X,;  the assumptions inherent in the model specification, X,;  the form 
of the demand model, X,;  and the estimator used, X,. 
where Xji and aj,  j  = S, A, D, E are conformably dimensioned vectors and ei 
is the stochastic error for the ith estimate. 
Smith and Kaoru (1987, 1988) have reviewed over 200 published and un- 
published travel cost demand models prepared over the period 1970-86  and 
developed a data set summarizing the valuation estimates, features of the re- 
sources involved in these demand studies, and characteristics of the models 
involved. The results reported here are based on 77 studies. They yield 734 
observations for the consumer surplus per unit of use. The individual obser- 
vations vary by recreation sites, demand specification,  modeling assumptions, 
and estimator used. 
There was enormous variability in the information reported across studies. 
Often the objective of the research was something other than estimating the 
values for a recreational facility. It may have been testing a specific hypothe- 
sis, with the results reported confined to the specifics of the hypothesis test. 
Smith and Kaoru did not attempt to contact individual authors to supplement 
(or check) what was reported in the individual papers. Rather their data set 
relies exclusively on the information reported within these limitations. Table 
10.7 defines some of  the variables that could be consistently defined across 
the studies in each class of variable. 
To  interpret the results obtained from statistical analyses of  valuation esti- 
mates across different studies, we must formulate specific hypotheses con- 
cerning how  and in what dimensions these estimates might be  sensitive to 
modeling judgments. A beginning step in this process can be found in past 
literature reviews (i.e., Ward and Loomis 1986; Smith and Desvousges 1986; 
Bockstael et al. 1987), as well as in what seem to be established conventions 
in developing travel cost demand models. A few such protocols would in- 
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Table 10.7  Description of Variables for Analysis 



















Marshallian consumer surplus estimated per unit of  use, as measured 
by each study (i.e., per day or per trip) deflated by consumer 
price index (base = 1967) 
measure, 0 for per day measure 
developed or state park, national park with or without wilderness 
significance are the designations; variables are unity if  satisfying 
designation, 0 otherwise 
Qualitative variable = 1 if  substitute price term was included in the 
demand specification, 0 otherwise 
Qualitative variable for measure used to estimate opportunity cost of 
travel time = 1 if an average wage rate was used 
Qualitative variable for measure of site use = 1 for per trip 
Lake, river, coastal area of wetlands, forest or mountain area, 
Qualitative variable for the second type of opportunity costs of travel 
time measure = 1 if income per hour used (omitted category was 
predicted individual specific wage) 
time 
describing demand for a set of sites = 1, 0 otherwise 
Fraction of wage rate used to estimate opportunity cost of travel 
Qualitative variable for use of a state or regional travel cost model 
Demand  Linear, log-linear and semilog (dep) are qualitative variables 
specifications  describing the specification of functional form for demand (semi- 
log in logs of independent variables was the omitted cateogory). 
OLS, GLS, and ML-TRUNC are qualitative variables for estimators 
used, omitted categories correspond to estimators with limited 









Use trips as the quantity measure where possible and attempt to segment 
the sample when it is known that the length of stay per trip is different. 
Take account through sample segmentation of differences that might arise 
from use during different seasons or during different time periods when 
there may be different time or resource constraints. 
Treat travel time as an element affecting the cost of a trip. 
Include vehicle-related  costs and the costs attributed to travel time as well 
as any entrance fees or site usage costs (i.e., parking costs, lift fees for 
skiing, etc.) in the unit cost estimated for a trip. 
Use substitute prices to measure effects of substitute sites rather than an 
index of  substitution; complete systems of demand functions are unnec- 
essary if the objective is to measure demand for one of the sites. 317  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
6.  Reflect quality features of the site in the demand models. 
7.  Recognize that heteroscedasticity is likely to be an issue with zone data 
and that selection effects can be important with individual data. 
8.  Avoid  the problems posed by  cost allocation issues that can arise with 
multiple destination trips by segmenting the sample according to the dis- 
tance traveled to the site. 
Substitute sensitivity analysis for strict adherence to one particular func- 
tional form of the demand function. 
Equally important, areas exist for which there are either insufficient data or 
the absence of a clear consensus. These are: 
1.  the measurement of the opportunity cost of travel time; simple scaling of 
the wage rate was not found to be consistent with several of the demand 
studies based  on individual data,  yet explicit recognition of  multiple 
prices for recreation time is generally beyond the information set avail- 
able in most current studies; to date no compromise has been proposed 
to deal with this problem; 
the treatment of the attributes of a site’s services; and 
the definition of a recreation site for modeling demand, especially where 
there are many comparable sites within a small geographic area or where 
there is one large “site” that extends over a wide area. 
What has been missing in past assessments is some gauge of how important 
the decisions might be in influencing the valuation estimates that result. 
From  the perspective of  being  able to transfer valuation estimates, we 
would prefer that the empirical estimates of equation (1  1) be consistent with a 
maintained hypothesis that aA  = cxD = aE  = 0. That is, judgmental modeling 
assumptions contribute to the variability in benefit estimates  but do not impose 
systematic influences on the size of the benefits estimated. Of  course, to the 
extent this is not our conclusion, then we believe the process has identified 
areas where further research, modeling, and  data collection may  be war- 
ranted. 
Table 10.8 provides some descriptive statistics from the Smith-Kaoru data 
on the features of the studies, classified by the type of site involved. It reports 
the number of estimates for each type of resource, the mean and range in real 
consumer surplus (per unit of  use) estimates, the proportion of  the studies 
based on individual (as compared with origin zone) data, and the range of 
years represented in the studies. It is clear that there are exceptionally wide 
variations in the consumer surplus per unit of  use-from  under $1 to over 
$100 in five of the seven cases. Two of these have estimates over $200. These 
differences could represent dramatic differences in the character of  the re- 
sources in  each group, in the models used, or in the characteristics of  the 
recreationists in each sample. 
Table 10.9 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for five mod- 
els which  consider whether the variations in real consumer surplus across 
9. 
2. 
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Table 10.8  A Comparison of navel Cost Demand Results by Qpe  of Resource 
Real Consumer Surplus' 
Type of  No. of 
Resource  Estimates  Mean  Range  PIb  Yearsc 
River  257  $17.05  $. 29-$120.70  .6  I  196683 
Lake  483  16.85  .09-2 19.80  .55  1968-83 
Forests  114  31.36  .8&129.90  .59  1968-84 
National parks  12  44.01  23.48-120.70  .50  1980-83 
Wetlands  9  45.86  17.45-120.70  .78  1980-83 
State parks  107  42.49  .67-327.20  .07  1972-83 
Coastal areas  28  35.49  .67-I 60.80  .61  1972-84 
Source: Smith and Kaoru (1990). 
'Real  consumer surplus deflates the nominal estimates by the consumer price index (base 1967). 
bThis  variable designates the proportion of  the studies based on samples of  individual recreation- 
ists' trip-taking decisions compared with origin zone aggregate rates of  use. 
cThe range of  years in which the data used in these studies were collected. Thus, this variable 
designates the range of  years across the studies in each category in which behavior was observed. 
Table 10.9  The Determinants of Real Consumer Surplus per Unit of Use 
Models 
Independent Variables  1  2  3  4  5 
Intercept 
Surtype 
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(2.08)  (6.19)  (3.68) 
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[ -  1.361  [2.34] 
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(-2.19) 
[ -  1.751 
-  25.99 
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(-2.12) 
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I  2  3  4  5 
Opportunity cost of type no. 1 
Opportunity cost of type no. 2 
Fraction of wage 
Specific sitehegional TC model 
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-  2.87 
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-  14.45 
(- .48) 
[ -  ,841 
-  8.58 
(- .28) 




.15  .42 
399  399 
Source: Smith and Kaoru (1990). 
Nore: The numbers in parentheses below the estimated parameters are the ratios of the coefficients 
to their estimated standard errors. The numbers in brackets are the Newey-West (1987) variant 
of  the White (1980) consistent covariance estimates for the standard errors in calculating these 
ratios. Small sample properties of the White estimate are discussed by Chesher and Jewitt (1987) 
and MacKinnon and White (1985). While these studies raise questions with  the approach for 
dealing with heteroscedasticity, it has not been evaluated in this more general case. 320  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
studies can be “explained” by the classes of  variables hypothesized in equa- 
tion (1 l). Models l and 2 in the table contain the least variables, with l con- 
sidering only qualitative variables describing the types of recreation site and 2 
variables describing the model specification. The remaining three models in- 
troduce groups of variables to illustrate the sensitivity of the estimates to the 
model specification, as well as to the reductions in  sample size implied by 
these more detailed formulations. These reductions arise from the incomplete 
information available in the papers used to construct the Smith-Kaoru data 
base. Model 5 is their preferred specification. 
The numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-ratios 
calculated with the OLS standard errors. Those in brackets below models 3-5 
are the  t-ratios using  the  standard errors estimated from the Newey-West 
(1987) proposed adaptation of the White (1980)  consistent covariance matrix. 
They are reported to gauge whether the panel nature of these data might have 
influenced any judgments on the importance of variables describing the sites 
or the modeling decisions. 
The Smith-Kaoru data set is a panel because there are a number of cases of 
multiple consumer surplus estimates reported from a single study. These can 
reflect different models estimated with data for a common recreation site, dif- 
ferent sites and associated data, or both. Given this diversity in the source of 
multiple observations per study, the model does not readily conform to either 
a simple fixed or a random effects model. Newey and West’s (1987) covari- 
ance estimator allows for a generalized form of  autocorrelation and heter- 
oscedasticity. As such, it provides a convenient gauge of the potential effects 
of the stochastic assumptions maintained in estimating the determinants of the 
real consumer surplus. 
Several conclusions emerge from this statistical summary of the literature. 
The results clearly support the basic approach to reviewing empirical litera- 
ture. The models’ estimates indicate that the type of resource, the modeling 
assumptions, specification of  the demand function, and estimator can influ- 
ence the resulting real consumer surplus estimates. 
For the most part, individual variables had effects consistent with a priori 
expectations. Nonetheless, there is at least one important aspect of the vari- 
able definitions that should be recognized. Our site classification variable is 
not a class of mutually exclusive categories. Some sites fall in multiple cate- 
gories. For example, a state park with a lake would imply unitary values for 
both of  these variables. The estimated coefficients must also be interpreted 
relative to an omitted category (coastal sites and wetlands), because all sites 
fell within at least one of  these definitions. Thus the differential a state park 
with a lake would imply in per unit consumer surplus over coastal areas is 
about  $2.00.  Nearly  all the  variables describing modeling  decisions were 
found to be statistically significant factors in describing the variation in real 
consumer surplus. 
Examples of these results, that are on the one hand consistent with intuition 321  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
yet also disturbing from the perspective of developing benefit estimates that 
are readily transferred, include the effects of the treatment of substitute price 
measures; the value of the opportunity costs of time; the specifications  used to 
capture the effects of multiple sites (e.g., the regional travel cost model); the 
demand specification (notably the double-log form); and  estimator used to 
account for the truncation effects present with site-intercept surveys. 
Overall these findings emphasize the sources of ambiguity in demand mod- 
eling described earlier. While the Smith-Kaoru findings represent a beginning 
and should be interpreted cautiously, some specific areas can be targeted de- 
spite this qualification. More careful consideration is warranted of  why  the 
treatment of time costs and the selection of  an estimator are so important to 
these valuation estimates. In the first case, the sensitivity reflects the fact that 
we do not know how the constraints to an individual’s time affect his recrea- 
tion decisions or how  an individual’s implicit values on time vary  with the 
nature of his choices. Data can be sought on both issues. 
Similarly, the importance of  the choice of  estimator probably reflects the 
difficult subsidiary issues involved in deciding how to deal with the sampling 
(Shaw 1988) and selection (Smith 1988) effects associated with intercept sur- 
veys. An effort to improve the situation through data collection would involve 
returning to the early population surveys (i.e., samples designed to be repre- 
sentative of all households, not just users) that elicited information on house- 
holds’ recreation choices. These surveys originally were sponsored by the Bu- 
reau of  Outdoor Recreation (see Cicchetti, Seneca, and  Davidson  1969). 
However, any new surveys would require information on the sites individuals 
use and their patterns of use to overcome the problems that arise in the on-site 
surveys. (The early BOR  surveys did not collect this type of  information.) 
Understanding the “market” for a recreation site lies at the heart of evaluating 
why substitute prices and the qualitative variable for regional travel cost mod- 
els were important. 
We  know very little of how individuals learn about and subsequently define 
(for choice purposes) the recreation opportunities  available to them. Decisions 
on the use of  “local” recreation sites versus more distant “national” sites will 
most certainly be made with different time horizons and constraints. How are 
these decisions to be distinguished and can they be modeled separately?  Prog- 
ress in modeling recreation decisions requires answers. 
The empirical models also identify an important role for the functional form 
selected to describe demand. The recreational demand literature has seen in- 
creasing criticism of the use of  arbitrary specifications selected largely for 
convenience or based on some fitting criteria. Several recent studies have ar- 
gued that behavioral derivations of demand models would be preferable. That 
is, they suggest models should begin with specific utility functions and derive 
estimating equations by assuming optimizing behavior and by specifying the 
budget and time constraints assumed to face individuals. Of course, analytical 
tractability constrains how these efforts can proceed. 322  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
We believe that there is not an obvious answer to the question of imposing 
prior theory versus using approximations. In .a genuine sense, all applications 
are approximations. What is important is whether the way they are undertaken 
affects the findings in important ways. The Smith-Kaoru results indicate that 
greater efforts are needed in developing more robust specifications. Both en- 
hanced data and theory will be required to meet this need. 
10.5  Recommendations for Data and Analytical Development 
When compared with the effort and experience devoted to the conventional 
topics  considered under  the  auspices of  the  Conference on  Income  and 
Wealth, the record of  empirical analyses of  public policies for the manage- 
ment of environmental resources is quite limited. While there has been rapid 
progress in the last two decades, our ability to deliver estimates of individuals’ 
values for a wide array of environmental  resources and, a fortiori, for changes 
in specific aspects of  resource quality lags significantly behind the expecta- 
tions of current environmental statutes and the projected needs for coming to 
grips with emerging policy issues. We  have tried to describe the sources of 
these demands and the clear interaction between the needs for economic and 
noneconomic information. 
In what follows we propose to use three themes to organize our proposals 
for new data developments in support of empirical research in environmental 
economics: learning about natural systems, learning what we know, and re- 
sponding to emerging policies. As we noted at the outset, our objective is to 
consider first the generic problems extending over multiple problems that re- 
quire data and, second, broad classes of  environmental problems that seem 
likely to be important policy issues in the near future. The policy orientation 
is deliberate. Resources for addressing data and modeling needs are scarce, 
and we need to consider their net returns here just as in other allocation deci- 
sions.  l6 
10.5.1  Learning about Natural Systems 
As we have stressed at several points, analysis of the benefits (or damages) 
of  proposed or actual changes in the use of natural resources inevitably de- 
pends on our abilities to trace the effect of the changed use through to a change 
in the valuation by consumers of a resource service. This implies that we must 
be able to (a) characterize the current state of the relevant system(s); (b) iden- 
tify a mechanism by  which the change in use affects the system; (c) model 
how the change has affected (for ex post damage assessment) or will affect 
(for ex ante regulatory analysis) the ambient quality of the system in terms 
relevant to consumer valuation. 
In many cases, our knowledge is deficient in every one of these categories. 
For example, we have a great deal of data on water quality but are generally 
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activities affect and that our regulations are designed to protect or enhance. 
Further, the available information usually covers items relevant to scientists’ 
search for understanding of  aquatic biological or chemical processes rather 
than those that can be related to consumer valuation (David 1971). Even so, 
to a large extent our abilities to model aquatic processes are inadequate. The 
models often do not accept as inputs discharges or give as outputs indicators 
of use or of resulting ambient quality relevant to policy evaluation needs. 
The great need here is for data-gathering and model-building efforts to re- 
flect the demands of policy analysis. Identifying the need is a great deal easier 
than meeting it, for the required interaction has all the difficulties of  interdis- 
ciplinary research plus those of  interstate and interagency jurisdictional dis- 
putes. Leadership from U.S.  EPA and the Council of Environmental Quality 
is clearly needed. 
10.5.2  Learning What We  Know 
Over a decade ago, in closing his overview of the state of the art in benefit 
estimation, Freeman (1979) observed that economists could advise the EPA 
administrator how to measure benefits from a particular pollution control pol- 
icy. All that was needed were the data and learning that accompany implemen- 
tation. The intervening decade has seen some positive investments in  both 
data collection and in empirical modeling. However, we cannot be overly san- 
guine about what has been accomplished. For the most part, the efforts have 
been very specialized-relying  on existing data on consumer behavior or de- 
veloping special purpose contingent valuation surveys to estimate how indi- 
viduals would value (or respond to) changes in very specific resources. This 
process has made it clear that under currently shrinking budgets (or even with 
modestly expanding resources), we cannot possibly estimate the values for all 
the resources of current interest. 
The notion of evaluating the conditions for transfemng estimates from one 
resource to another is a relative new one. It has been an important part of the 
practice of developing the information benefit-cost evaluations involving non- 
marketed resources. Freeman (1984) distinguished top-down and bottom-up 
transfers, where the former attempts to allocate an aggregate benefit for a 
change in all of one type of  resource (e.g., the share of the national benefits 
from a water quality improvement attributed to one site), and the latter refers 
to using microestimates for the household and  a specific resource in other 
contexts and  aggregating. Naughton, Parsons,  and  Desvousges (1991) re- 
cently considered the generic issues in performing benefit transfers at the mi- 
crolevel using  the  pulp  and  paper  industry.  Their  results  suggest that  a 
transfer-based strategy for policy analyses is desirable but may  require re- 
structuring the design of  future benefit estimation studies for environmental 
resources. 
Another possibility proposed by Mitchell and Carson (1986) involves using 
survey methods to obtain estimates for national improvements in an environ- 324  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
mental resource from individual households. These estimates would then be 
attributed to individual areas based on the amount of the resources present in 
the area. The example these authors used  involved water quality improve- 
ments, and comparison of their approach with the results from a separate con- 
tingent valuation indicated a fairly close correspondence between the esti- 
mates derived from a specific survey and those from their national survey 
adjusted with their proposed proportioning method. At this stage, however, 
the literature is very preliminary. There has been no attempt to develop how 
the tasks involved in deriving transferable models are related to the factors 
(i.e., household and resource characteristics) affecting the variation in benefit 
estimates across resources and user groups. 
First, we must leam what we know from experiences to date, and then we 
must proceed to identify what we need to learn. There is a long tradition in 
resource economics involving attempts to  develop consensus  practices in 
benefit-cost analysis and even specifying benchmark valuation estimates for 
resource services most closely aligned with  water resource projects. These 
attempts were traditionally associated with the Water Resources Council. Our 
suggestion here is that we  should extend these efforts to the valuation esti- 
mates for all environmental resources and thereby move beyond a judgment- 
based, single value for each type of resource service. 
By  treating the existing set of  estimates for changes in the quantities or 
qualities of  environmental resources as data, it is possible to develop a sys- 
tematic appraisal of  whether the state of  the art has  advanced to the point 
where we can associate variations in estimates with differences in the proce- 
dures used  or with features of  the resources (or consumers) involved. This 
process should identify the areas with greatest uncertainty. 
The experience with the  Smith-Kaoru pilot  study of  travel cost demand 
studies suggests that a more systematic approach, contacting authors to fill in 
missing details, is essential if  a reasonably adequate data base is to be de- 
veloped in areas in which there has been less research activity. Such efforts 
would also promote the development of  statistical methods for dealing with 
the unique features of  “panel” data sets composed from existing empirical 
studies. 
10.5.3  Emerging Policy Needs 
gories and now consider each in turn. 
1.  Environmental  Risk 
This is one of the most difficult areas for current uses of economic analysis, 
especially because it appears that individuals’ responses to a wide range of 
environmental risks do not conform to our conventional characterization of 
rational behavior. A recent EPA publication (see U.S.  EPA  1987a) has high- 
lighted just how  dramatically inconsistent are public concerns and the rank- 
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ings of  environmental risks based on expert opinion (U.S. EPA  1987b). A 
comprehensive program of data acquisition and research is needed to deter- 
mine how and why households value reductions in these types of risks more 
highly than other sources that often have greater likelihoods of serious effects. 
This type of analysis will be important to the design of  information pro- 
grams associated with pollutants EPA  does not  currently regulate, such as 
radon, and to the development of  labeling standards for products for which 
they do have responsibility. It is also likely to play a central role in defining 
“clean” for Superfund sites, in establishing priorities for policy initiatives in- 
volving monitoring the underground storage tanks, and in devising new poli- 
cies associated with more stringent drinking water standards. 
2.  Air Quality 
Acid deposition is hardly “emerging” as an issue; rather the reverse. But 
that is not because the scientific questions have been answered and the prob- 
lems have been solved. Indeed, there is still debate in the scientific literature 
over the relative contribution of different compounds and source locations to 
observed low pH precipitation, fog, and dry acidic deposition. Under these 
circumstances, benefit estimation linked to a discharge-reduction policy can- 
not proceed to meaningful results. So a clear need is for further research into 
long-run atmospheric transport and chemical transformation processes, with 
the ultimate aim of allowing predictions of the form: If we reduce sulfur diox- 
ide (SO,) discharges in this region by this much, average pH of precipitation 
in this other region will increase by this much. 
Even then we shall still be several steps from successful benefit estimation 
for a policy of SO, reduction. It must be possible to extend predictive natural 
system models to such issues as the link between average annual (or season- 
specific) precipitation, pH, and soil quality to vegetation health and growth, 
and to aquatic ecological system functions. For example, if  we reduce SO, 
discharge in the Middle West, will New  England and New  York  lakes and 
ponds have better fish populations (more and larger fish of more highly valued 
species)? 
Only with those tools in hand will it be possible for economists to produce 
meaningful benefit estimates for the sorts of policies that are regularly debated 
in the Congress. To  prepare for that day, the problems of benefit (or damage) 
function transfer must be addressed in this problem setting. In particular, it is 
necessary to consider how best to use the results of national studies on the one 
hand (e.g., Vaughan and Russell 1982) and local studies on the other (e.g., 
Smith and Desvousges 1986) to value regional effects. 
A second air quality issue with even larger potential economic implications 
is ground-level ozone and particularly the value of  trying to attain the cur- 
rently mandated National Ambient Air Quality Standards for that secondary 
pollutant.17  Here it is necessary to improve our knowledge of  (a) the sources 
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pounds [VOCS]), of ground-level ozone in urban and rural areas; (b) the mor- 
bidity effects of different levels of ozone; (c) the effects of  ozone on vegetation 
and a variety of materials such as paints, plastics, and synthetic rubbers. Our 
estimates of  the damages attributable to days of  sickness of  various types 
and severities must be refined. Moreover, theoretically consistent but practi- 
cally implementable ways of measuring the value of damage to materials pro- 
viding services to households, businesses, and governments must be devel- 
oped. 
3. Water Quality 
One of the key policy initiatives in water quality will be associated with the 
national estuarine program.  For point sources of  waterborne pollution, the 
first round of  efluent guidelines will be in place with over 30 regulations 
promulgated. All should be  in place by  the early 1990s. The future here is 
best characterized as one requiring extensions in the ability of economic val- 
uation to realize greater degrees of resolution in valuing small changes in pol- 
lutants. 
Present methods and data would not permit such evaluations. Clearly an 
improved understanding of  the linkage between the technical dimensions of 
water quality and individuals’  perceptions of and corresponding valuations for 
that quality will be necessary (David 1971). 
Nonpoint sources, especially agricultural runoff of pesticides and fertilizers 
to surface waters, represent the largest unregulated source of water pollutants. 
Presently, EPA does not have authority to regulate these sources. However, 
recent opportunities to coordinate the selection of  areas for the Department of 
Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program, based on the effects of  pollu- 
tants on water resources, expose a new area for economic valuation. Can we 
set priorities for the selection of  lands for inclusion in this system based on 
their contributions to nonpoint source pollution? To  answer this question we 
need both economic and noneconomic data. Agriculture has been wiling to 
pay  premia over normal reserve payments for withholding lands that might 
otherwise contribute to impairing significant environmental resources. 
4.  Stock Pollutants and Global Climate Change 
This last area is fundamentally different than the first three emerging issues 
we  discussed in that the policy time horizon is long-term and extends over 
several decades. While not a new issue (Revelle 1985 suggested that it was 
identified over 100 years ago), it has achieved a more prominent role on the 
policy agenda with the Global Climate Protection Act of  1987. This legisla- 
tion assigns to EPA the responsibility of  summarizing the scientific under- 
standing of the greenhouse effect (i.e., the role of  the accumulation of carbon 
dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons,  methane, and other trace gases in the upper at- 
mosphere in increasing the average surface temperatures on earth) and in enu- 
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As in our other examples, a key need in this area is for greater understand- 
ing of the natural system. In this case it is the link between these atmospheric 
gases and the extent and timing of  any global warming, as well as of  the 
implications of that global warming for regional weather patterns. This issue 
raises some distinct methodological needs because of the extent of  scientific 
uncertainty over these questions, the time horizon for the potential climatic 
changes, and the irreversibility of the process. 
The requirements for economic information depend, in part, on the prog- 
ress made in improving our understanding of the natural system. As this pro- 
ceeds, there is a clear need to understand the processes by  which economic 
activities adapt and the institutions that facilitate such adjustment. Historical 
and cross-cultural analyses may well offer the only means for developing such 
insights. Equally important, there is a fundamental need to describe the inher- 
ent uncertainties in a way that is genuinely informative for policy. While not 
unique to this problem, this issue of communicating the inherent uncertainties 
remains one of the most significant problems facing economists involved in 
environmental policy. 
Finally, in evaluating these data and modeling needs as compared with other 
data priorities, it is important to recognize that in contrast to positive uses of 
economic analysis where a lack of  data may  prevent decisions from being 
made, this is not the case in normative applications. Decisions are made re- 
gardless of  whether the economic information is available. In some cases they 
are very bad ones. Consequently, here new data developments represent op- 
portunities to improve the quality of  decisions and the resource allocations 
affected by them. 
Appendix 
Calculating Surro  ate BeneJits Based on the 
Quality Projections 
Baltimore and De  f  aware River Environmental 
Air Quality Surrogate Benefits 
Oates, Portney, and McGartland (1989) reproduce their atmospheric mod- 
el’s projected patterns of total suspended particulate concentrations for 23 re- 
ceptor locations in Baltimore for two alternative implementation approaches. 
We  used and reproduce their table 2 here as table 10A. 1. (We ignore their 
results for 83 micrograms/m3,  ug/m3.) We  follow them in taking the pattern 
associated with the 120 ug/m3  standard as our base situation. 
While Oates et al. (1989) describe the basis for their damage, and hence 
benefit estimates, they did not provide the functions they used. However, it 
turns out that a surrogate function that reproduces the pattern of their margi- 328  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
Table lOA.1  TSP Concentrations by Receptor: Least-Cost Case 
Receptor 
Location  120  115  I10  105  100  95  90  85 
1  67.8 
2  64.6 
3  56.2 
4  85.4 
5  94.3 
6  107.2 
7  116.3 
8  93.3 
9  119.7 
10  52.4 
11  80.2 
12  102.8 
13  61.6 
14  53.3 
15  120.0 
16  56.4 
17  72.4 
18  84.9 
19  51.6 
20  67.3 
21  64.0 
22  64.6 















































Unweighted averages of receptor TSP levels: 

























65.3  63.7  61.6  59.3 
60.9  58.7  55.5  51.7 
55.3  54.6  53.7  52.5 
76.8  73.7  70.9  68.1‘ 
83.8  80.5  76.9‘  73.5’ 
95.0”  90.7“  85.7’  80.P 
100.0”  953  90.0a  85.0” 
81.6  75.6  69.9’  63.Y 
100.0’  95.2’  89.5’  84.7’ 
46.0  43.4  40.9  38.2 
70.1  68.8  65.7  63.5 
84.3a  79.7O  74.5’  69.2a 
56.0  53.9  51.4  49.2 
50.6  49.4  48.1  46.4 
54.3  52.9  52.2  50.9 
63.5  59.4  53.1  43.3 
73.0  66.4  62.5  55.9 
50.1  49.3  48.3  47.3 
62.1  60.0  57.5  54.4 
60.0  57.1  55.0  52.0 
59.7  56.5  55.4  53.1 
95.1’  90.4’  83.P  74.1’ 
99.6‘  93.0’  793  53.3a 
71.4  68.2  64.4  59.6 
Population-weighted averages of  receptor TSP levels: 
77.4  75.7  72.9  70.9  69.0  66.2  62.9  59.3 
Source: Oates, Portney, and McGartland (1989). 
’Concentration reflected in the calculation of  benefits using method (ii). 
nal benefits is easy to find. We  used  a simple quadratic damage surrogate. 
That is: 
(Al)  G, = damage at receptor i = [TSP ppmI2 X  lo3 
(in millions). 
Benefits of increasingly strict standards are then simply 
(A2) 
We  reproduce here, as table 10A.2, a sample calculation of  the damages 
and benefits for six receptor locations, one standard, and three methods. In- 
spection of  table 10A.  1 reveals immediately that method (i) yields an estimate 
Bi  = Gi  (120) -  Gi(j)  forj < 120 ug/m3. 329  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
Table 10A.2  Examples of Surrogate Damage and Benefit Calculations by Method 
Method (i) (Modified)  Method (ii)  Method (iii‘) 
Damages at  Damages  Damages  Damages 
Receptor  Base Level  at 110  Benefits  at 110  Benefits  at 110  Benefits 
2  4.2  4.2  0  3.9  0.3 
7  13.5  12.1  1.4  11.6  1.9 
10  2.1  2.7  0  2.4  0.3 
12  10.6  10.6  0  8.4  2.2 
15  14.4  12.1  2.3  12.1  2.3 
18  1.2  1.2  0  5.6  1.6 
For average 
Total  23.6  6.0  19.7 
level:  6.4  5.4  1.03 X  23 
Marginal  11.4  3.4  12.0 
Note: For modified method (i), base average surrogate damages = damages at the base average 
concentration, 80.1. Damages at the 110 standard = damages calculated for an average concen- 
tration of  80.1  X  110/120 = 73.4. Total damages for every standard are obtained by multiplying 
the damage associated with the average by  23 (receptors). 
of  zero benefits for all standards, since the initial average quality is already 
better than the strictest standard to be examined. 
Water Quality Benefits 
Water quality benefits are based on predicted water quality improvements 
in the Delaware estuary published in Spofford, Russell, and Kelley (1976). 
The quality indicator used is dissolved oxygen (DO) and the base levels are 
interpolated from their figure 2 reproduced here as figure 10A.  1. Improve- 
ments associated with alternative standards are taken from table C-3 in the 
source. Their run, using a 3.0 ppm standard, is used here as a surrogate for a 
3.5 ppm standard because in all but one reach, better than 3.5 ppm is attained 
under it. The predicted levels of DO for that standard and for a run with a 5.0 
pprn standard are set out in table 10A.3. The implementation plan implicit in 
these runs is the least-cost arrangement of discharge reductions. 
To calculate benefits, dissolved oxygen is translated into sustainable recre- 
ation activities using the table of  equivalents developed by  Vaughan  (1981) 
and displayed here schematically as table 10A.4. Then the three alternative 
methods of benefit calculation were applied as summarized in table lOA.5, 
where the per capita per day values of the alternative sustainable activity mea- 
sures of quality are drawn from (Smith and Desvousges 1986). 
What we have not done is to associate numbers of people with particular 
receptor  locations along  the  river.  (“Receptor location”  is  usually  called 
“reach” in the water pollution field. It means a stretch of river within which 
ambient quality is assumed the same.) This is difficult to do in any case with- 
out a study to measure the recreational suitability as determined by nonwater 330  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
0 1  2 
1 
nme  2  Zone 3  Zone 4  Zone5 
I  I  I  0 
Flow at Trenton = 4572 cfs  17 
Vj5  bg  f 
quality characteristics.  But  it is even more difficult to do within a massive 
urbanized  agglomeration such as that which surrounds the Delaware estuary 
from Wilmington,  Delaware,  to Trenton,  New  Jersey.  The figures  in table 
10.5 are therefore simply the sums of the relevant per capita benefits over all 
the reaches. These figures exaggerate the penalty for ignorance of the environ- 
ment to the extent that more individuals could easily travel to and recreate on 
the middle reaches. They are the most heavily polluted, and therefore benefits 
associated with their cleanup show up in methods (i) and (ii), while any ben- 
efits associated with further cleanup of the most upstream  and most down- 
stream reaches tend to be ignored in those methods. 
Note that the use of  Vaughan's equivalence in essence begs an important 
question: Do we have an environmental quality indicator that is connectable 
both to discharges and to valued human uses of  the environment? Dissolved 
oxygen is only one of the elements of a vector of water quality characteristics 
that determine how a body of water can be used. It may be the key element 
for  fish  populations  but  is  certainly  much  less  important  in  determining 
whether water is "boatable"  (that is to say, pleasant to boat on) or swimable 
(where bacterial counts or turbidity are much more important). 
Notes 
1. To  say that  the  analysis is difficult (and expensive) is not to  say that  it  is of 
dubious value. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (1987a) review of its use Table 10A.3  Base Case and Redicted Levels of Dissolved Oxygen: %o 
Alternative Standards Applied to the Delaware Estuary (ppm) 
Base  3.5 ppm  5.0 ppm 





























































































Source: Spofford, Russell, and Kelley (1976). 
“The standard actually imposed by Spofford, Russell, and Kelley (1976) was 3.0 ppm. But 3.5 
is a lower bound for boatable quality water in the Vaughan scale, so we treat this run as though 
the standard were 3.5 for purposes of method (ii) calculations. 
Table 10A.4  Water Quality, Recreational Activities, and Associated 
Willingness to Pay 
Sustainable  Associated Annual Marginal 
DO PPm  Activity”  Shorthand  Willingness to Pay per Person ($)b 




5.5  Game fishable (plus  G 
boating) 
5.0 
4.5  Boatable  B 
4.0 
3.5 





‘Source: Vaughan (1981). 
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Table 10A.5  Calculating Surrogate Benefits for Dissolved Oxygen Improvements 
in the Delaware Estuary by Method 
A. Method (i) 
Base Case Average: 
3.5 ppm Standard: 
5.0 ppm Standard: 
3.7 ppm (B) 
3.5 ppm (B)  Benefit = 0 x  22  = 0 





Method  (11)  Methods (ii) and (111) 
Base Case 
Sustainable Use  3 5 Standard  5 0 Standard 
Marginal Benefits 
Method (iii) 
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Note: A dash (-)  indicates no improvement in sustainable recreational  use over the next lower 
standard or over the base case as appropriate. S = swimable; G = game fishable; B = boatable; 
U  = unacceptable for boating. 
of benefit-cost (B-C) analysis concludes that for three regulatory decisions, B-C anal- 
ysis identified improvements with potential benefits of over $10 billion (lead in auto- 
motive fuels, $6.7 billion; used lubricating oil, $3.6 billion; and premanufacturing 
review of toxic substances, $.04 billion). Further, EPA estimates the costs of all regu- 
latory impact analyses (RIAs) done under the terms of  President Reagan’s Executive 
Order 12291 as less than $10 million. Therefore, the return to analytical investment 
appears to be over 1,000  to  1 in the aggregate. 
Several cautions are in order in interpreting this conclusion. Most fundamentally, 
our argument in this paper, if  one accepts it, must inevitably throw some doubt on 333  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
these benefit estimates. Second, we cannot necessarily project such a return ratio in the 
future because it is likely that the biggest and easiest targets have already been at- 
tacked. And finally, we should include a grain of salt because the self-interest of those 
preparing the report was consistent with finding large returns. 
2.  This statutory requirement has not prevented benefit cost information from being 
included in the RIAs prepared for cases involving the primary standards. The proposed 
standard subjected to analysis is health based. It is too early to know whether the final 
standard that emerges after OMB review can be argued to have been affected by the 
benefit-cost findings. 
3. Location is, of course, three dimensional, and altitude can make a big difference 
in some situations; but the points we make are only reinforced by considering a third 
dimension, while exposition is much simpler for two. 
4.  This last point is stressed by Oates, Portney, and McGartland (1989). We  shall 
return to it below. 
5. Our discussion assumes that producers will in fact comply with the regulations 
in question. Making sure this is even roughly the case requires investment in monitor- 
ing and enforcement. These costs should be counted as costs of the policy, and their 
amount and how they are used will help determine the realized level of benefits. It is 
also true that choices open in the design of implementation systems can affect monitor- 
ing and enforcement costs and thus also indirectly affect benefits by that route. We 
ignore these added complications,  though they open up an entirely new and largely 
unexplored source of  demand for data and analysis. 
6.  Reasonably straightforward theoretical expositions are available that include dif- 
ferential location. See, e.g., Fgrsund (1972), Tietenberg (1978), and Siebert (1985). 
7.  The matrix T may be thought of as representing the steady-state solution to a set 
of differential equations that reflects the transportation of pollution by average winds 
characterized by velocities and directions, and the diffusion of the pollution particles 
due to random motion in the plume. If the units of discharge are, say (average) tons 
per day, the units of the elements of Tcould be (average) micrograms per cubic meter. 
8.  For simplicity, it is assumed that the same damage relation applies at each recep- 
tor location, though as  just stressed, we would expect the damages for a given pollutant 
concentration to differ across the various points in the regional space. 
9. Here we calculate {Q} on the basis of Do  and T, but for the argument that follows, 
it is important to note that baseline ambient quality is actually realized and therefore 
can be measured. Thus, there is no inconsistency in assuming knowledge of {Q} and 
ignorance of T.  As a practical matter, however, we may very well be ignorant of {Q} in 
any but the loosest, one might say anecdotal, sense. See, e.g., Russell, Vaughan, and 
Feng (1983). To be useful, our knowledge of ambient quality conditions must be re- 
flected in measurements that are (1) meaningful in terms of their links with or effects 
on human valuation of environmental services, and (2) connectable to pollution dis- 
charges that will have to be altered to change ambient quality. We return to this matter 
of baseline quality in the final section. 
10.  The actual patterns of ambient quality produced by the rollback implementation 
method under the baseline and the alternative standards are: 
Receptor  Base  S,,  S,  S,  S, 
I  10  8.0  6.0  4.0  2.0 
I1  8  6.4“  4.8  3.2  1.6 
I11  6  4.8’  3.6‘  1.6  1.2 
Superscript “a” indicates a quality level not reflected at all in benefit calculation (ii). 
11.  It should be emphasized that there is no reason to expect a mathematically de- 
sirable-or  even smooth-pattern  for marginal benefits. The complex relation among 
standard, discharge reduction amounts and location required under a given implemen- 334  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
tation method, and resulting pattern of ambient quality changes, can produce virtually 
any pattern of marginal benefits. 
12.  For a description of efforts to use natural world models in water quality benefit 
estimation, although some of the threshold aspects of the BZ  method are still used, see 
Vaughan and Russell (1982). 
13. This section is based on research undertaken by Yoshiaki Kaoru and Smith and 
is reported in more detail in Smith and Kaoru (1990). 
14. See Mitchell and Carson (1989) for an overview of the issues involved in using 
these methods. 
15. This approach is not completely new to economics. Berndt’s (1976) early at- 
tempt to reconcile the diverse estimates of elasticities of substitution between capital 
and labor is similar to our objectives.  However, in his case,  the focus was on the 
assumptions inherent in the estimation models and their likely implications for the 
estimates.  Somewhat more closely aligned is the Hazilla-Kopp (1986) summary of 
their  findings on the  sensitivity of  the  characterization of  substitution possibilities 
across different modeling decisions made with the 36 different manufacturing sectors 
they analyzed. In this case, the analysis parallels what we propose, but their objective 
was to summarize their own findings, rather than detect sources of differences across 
studies conducted by different individuals. 
16. Thanks are due to Tom Tietenberg for suggesting that we make this point more 
explicit. 
17. Ozone is “secondary” because it is formed in the atmosphere from chemical 
reactions involving sunlight and certain “primary” or discharged pollutants, especially 
volatile organic compounds such as gasoline, solvents, and oxides of nitrogen. 
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Comment  Thomas H. Tietenberg 
This is a pioneering paper in the field. Very  few authors have taken on the 
awesome responsibility of assessing the state of the art in data availability for 
supporting environmental  policy.  Pioneering papers  written  by  top-notch 
scholars, such as Russell and Smith, are exciting for the new  insights they 
offer and the possibilities for further research that they uncover. They are also 
a bit frustrating because they serve to open our eyes to how far we are from 
complete understanding of the most rational course of action for the future. 
In investigating data needs for environmental policy, economists are con- 
fronted with problems above and beyond those faced by those collecting data 
for more conventional purposes. Not only are data on natural systems essen- 
tial, a point made with appropriate force and clarity in the Russell-Smith pa- 
per, but also substantial and vocal opposition inevitably arises whenever the 
idea of putting a price tag on certain aspects of the environment is discussed. 
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The very idea of monetizing our relationship with nature debases that relation- 
ship in the eyes of many activists in the area. The fact that much, if  not most, 
of  the  environmental legislation  specifically excludes benefit  information 
from the standard-setting process reveals that this is no backwater view held 
by a few. In short, we continuously find it necessary to defend vigorously the 
objective of data collection, not merely to devote more time to thinking up 
better data to collect. 
There is much to admire in this paper and I shall single out some areas for 
special attention. It represents an inductive approach to setting priorities; Rus- 
sell and Smith review what has been done as a means of identifying the holes. 
By  drawing upon their considerable experience in empirical environmental 
policy analysis, the authors are able to isolate some areas where the data needs 
are apparent. Their conclusions are reasonable and helpful. 
Yet  I could not help feeling that a deductive approach, perhaps as a comple- 
ment to their analysis rather than as a substitute, would have been helpful. 
Such an approach would have set some broad goals for data collection and 
modeling and then sought to derive priorities from these goals. Motivated by 
this feeling that a deductive approach has merit and could generate some in- 
sights that would be overlooked by an inductive approach, let me briefly ex- 
plore this idea. 
A very simple economics of information model provides the framework for 
my critique. Information is a scarce commodity and increasing its supply is 
expensive. Efficient management of  information is a corollary to the efficient 
design of environmental policy. Efficiency is achieved when the value of the 
marginal dollar spent on data collection and model building is equal to the 
marginal cost. 
The first point suggested by this model is not likely to be a popular one with 
this audience. It is not obvious that economists  can in  general be counted 
upon to recommend an amount of  data collection that would conform to the 
eficiency  condition. At  this kind of  conference economists have  an under- 
standable bias toward calling for more and better data and being somewhat 
less sensitive to the costs of this commodity than would be normal for other 
commodities. Our ability to make unique contributions to policy debates fre- 
quently hinges crucially on our ability to back up our arguments with empiri- 
cal results. Add  the realization that we do not directly pay  the bill for the 
requested data makes the urge for more data almost irresistable. To their credit 
Russell and Smith have not fallen into this trap. At least they have not com- 
pletely fallen into this trap. 
I would like to share with you a few other implications of  applying this 
simple economics of  information model to the problem at hand-deducing 
the needs for improving the data available to assist in creasing more efficient 
environmental policy. In  many,  but not all, cases these insights support the 
conclusions reached in the Russell-Smith paper. 
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budget constraint, what principles should be used to prioritize data collection 
expenditures? Russell and Smith focus most of  their paper on the need for 
better data collection to support improved benefit estimates to be used in stan- 
dard setting. In the beginning of  their paper they do not really distinguish 
between data needs for setting discharge standards and data needs for setting 
ambient standards. 
The economics of  information model suggests that data collected to sup- 
port the setting of  ambient air quality standards probably produces a higher 
value than data collected in support of  setting discharge standards. The value 
of additional data is largely determined by its contribution to improved policy. 
Since the EPA’s Emissions Trading Program creates a pressure toward cost- 
effective air-pollutant discharge standards even when the decisions of the reg- 
ulatory authority are based on limited or poor information, better data contrib- 
utes little to this particular standard-setting process. 
Why this particular regulatory program has such a remarkable capacity to 
produce more cost-effective outcomes in the face of limited information is not 
difficult to understand. Setting standards for each discharge point where air 
pollutants are emitted is a very difficult task for the regulator. Ideally control 
costs would play a role in setting these standards, but as a practical matter this 
is rarely done. The regulatory simply do not possess the requisite amount of 
information. To compensate for this lack of information, under the Emissions 
Trading Program the EPA allows various sources to trade control responsibil- 
ity among themselves, as long as air quality is improved (or at least not de- 
graded) by  the trade.  Mechanically this is accomplished by  certifying any 
emission reduction that exceeds legal requirements as an “emission reduction 
credit.” This credit then becomes completely transferable and can be used to 
satisfy the legal requirements at another, presumably more expensive to con- 
trol, discharge point. 
The power of this approach is derived from the fact that individual polluters 
have very good information on the menu of control options at their disposal, 
but the regulators do not. This system provides the incentive for those who 
have the information to use it in socially productive ways, eliminating the 
need to transfer that information from plant managers to regulators. As is well 
known, there is every reason to believe that any transferred information would 
be biased anyway, since regulatory outcomes would be based on it. In  the 
Emissions Trading Program the responsibility for choosing the best outcome 
was transferred to those with the best knowledge as an  alternative to generat- 
ing more data for the regulators. 
While this is a powerful argument against devoting large amounts of  re- 
sources to better define discharge standards, it does not apply to the process 
for setting ambient  standards. Since no corresponding market-type process 
exists for assuring the desirability of  the ambient standards, data collection 
and modeling efforts aimed at improving ambient standards are likely to have 339  Demands for Data and Analysis Introduced by Environmental Policy 
a much higher payoff, in terms of improved outcomes, than efforts directed at 
improving discharge standards. 
Not all ambient standards are equally deserving of enhanced data collec- 
tion eforts. While it is not my intention to lay out before you which ones are 
the most deserving (the fact that I do not know probably has something to do 
with my reluctance), a few of the variables that would enter that analysis can 
be identified, and merely identifying them raises some interesting questions. 
For ambient standards the benefits are a function of the magnitude of  the 
individual damage inflicted upon each exposed human, tree, structure, and so 
on, multiplied by  the number of  those exposed. Given the sheer number of 
people and geographic areas exposed, does this imply that the global pollu- 
tants (such as those responsible for the destruction of the ozone shield or for 
global warming) should receive special attention in our data gathering efforts? 
Historically they have not. 
One possible response might be that the effects of  global pollutants are 
likely to occur so far into the future that the present value of more data collec- 
tion is small at any reasonable discount rate. Is the use of  the present value 
criterion ethically justified in this circumstance where current decisions are 
likely to have irreversible impacts on the earth’s climate? I believe it is not. 
The desire for better risk management does not always translate into large 
expenditures designed to provide better data availability to regulators, espe- 
cially for employment and product-related risks. An alternative approach is to 
use the court system to generate information directly for consumers so that 
they can evaluate the risks they face as an alternative to direct regulation of 
that risk. For example, the courts have recently made clear to asbestos sup- 
pliers that corporate awareness of a risk associated with their products triggers 
a duty to warn those exposed to it. Failure to respect this duty usually results 
in the firm being forced to bear the liability for the resulting damage, whereas 
firms providing adequate warning can escape liability as long as they are not 
otherwise negligent. 
Appropriately applied tort law remedies trigger new  data for consumers 
without the unnecessary intermediate step of supplying more data for regula- 
tors. While analysts will still need to contribute to the development of a con- 
sistent research methodology for use by the courts in measuring damages, this 
is a rather different role than deriving national benefit estimates to be used in 
defining the level of “acceptable” risk. And it implies a rather different data- 
gathering strategy as well. 
Two of  the contributions of this paper that I found particularly stimulating 
dealt usefully and realistically with the problem of  constructing reasonable 
policy in the face of  limited data and very short deadlines for the analysis. 
The first was the rather extended analysis of the accuracy of traditional and 
widely used rules of thumb in benefit estimation. This is an important issue 
precisely because it recognizes that information is a scarce commodity. To the 340  Clifford S. Russell and V.  Kerry Smith 
extent that simple rules of thumb, which require little informational input, are 
“in the ballpark,” their use may be a preferred solution to gathering all of the 
costly  information necessary  to  provide  a  full-blown evaluation. Unfortu- 
nately the Russell-Smith results are primarily negative; simple rules of thumb 
seem to do rather poorly. 
The second noteworthy contribution reported on the Smith-Kaoru attempt 
to determine the degree to which existing estimates can be transferred to new 
valuation problems. The ability to transfer estimates would facilitate maxi- 
mizing the value of the limited amount of data allowed by permitting its use 
for many purposes. Here the preliminary results are mixed. On the one hand 
their results suggest that estimates cannot be transferred from one recreation 
site to another by simply noting the differences in site attributes as isolated by 
hedonic price approaches. On the other hand, the fact that those areas were 
analytical judgments seem to exert a systematic influence can be  isolated at 
least provides a point of departure for beginning to eliminate those influences. 
Since the process that governs the effects of  environmental policy is  so 
complex (and therefore the data needed to completely document what is going 
on would be so expensive to collect), the Russell-Smith admonition that we 
should pay much more attention to getting the most out of any data that we do 
collect makes a great deal of sense. Studies designed as an integral piece in a 
larger research puzzle have rather different characteristics than studies de- 
signed to shed light on a single, geographically isolated policy concern; not 
all urgent policy issues have an equal claim on scarce data-collection dollars. 
The Russell-Smith recommendation for establishing protocols for research 
procedures to facilitate the transfer of  estimates from one setting to another 
would be a very good start, providing we can be clear about what are the right 
protocols. 
The large cost of these studies has implications not only for the standardiza- 
tion of research methodology, but also for public-sector research funding. Or- 
chestrated research depends upon orchestrated funding. Since orchestrated 
finding is more difficult than independent funding, this will impose an addi- 
tional public-sector burden,  especially since the statutory responsibility for 
controlling environmental problems falls on so many different agencies. How- 
ever, if the resulting information can be synthesized to produce insights that 
are more than the simple sum of the conclusions of the individual studies, the 
results would have a much wider applicability and the expenditures would be 
easier to justify. 
In summary, the environmental and natural resource research community 
has its work cut out for it in the future. The data needed for “full-information’’ 
support of  environmental policy is sufficiently costly that it is unreasonable 
for us to simply expect that all desired data will be forthcoming. Realizing 
this, it is incumbent upon us  to set priorities for data collection, to use the 
available information more effectively, and, where appropriate, to use inno- 
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markets,  as an alternative to transferring a great deal of information to regu- 
lators.  Russell and Smith have made some very useful  contributions in this 
paper to this emerging field of inquiry. I have tried to complement their anal- 
ysis by suggesting further considerations for setting priorities and construct- 
ing reasonable  policy  in  a very limited information  world.  Much more re- 
mains to be done. This Page Intentionally Left Blank